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#COURTSTOO: CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE #METOO ERA
Zachary Johnson*
INTRODUCTION
The federal judiciary in recent years has been rocked by allegations of sexual
harassment.1 In 2017, on the heels of the Judge Kozinski scandal,2 Chief Justice
Roberts recognized that the judiciary is not immune to the problem of sexual
harassment in the workplace.3 In an effort to devise a workable solution to the problem
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2021; Bachelor of Arts, University of West
Florida, 2018. I first thank my wife for her unrelenting love and support. I thank my parents and brother for
always encouraging me in my studies. Thanks to Professor Richard Garnett for his feedback and to my fellow
Journal of Legislation staff members for their valuable assistance. Finally, a special thanks to Raija Churchill
Munk for her help and for bringing the issue of judicial accountability to my attention. All errors are my own.
1
For example, on February 13, 2020, Olivia Warren, a former law clerk to the late Judge Stephen
Reinhardt of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, testified before a House Judiciary subcommittee
that Judge Reinhardt kept “a shelf in [his] office where he kept pictures of some of his female ‘pretty’ clerks”
and “routinely and frequently made disparaging statements about [Warren’s] physical appearance, [her] views
about feminism and women’s rights, and [her] relationship with [her] husband (including [their] sexual
relationship).” Protecting Federal Judiciary Employees from Sexual Harassment, Discrimination, and Other
Workplace Misconduct: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet,
116th Cong. 6–7 (statement of Olivia Warren). Shortly after Warren’s testimony, a statement published “by
72 former Reinhardt clerks in support of Warren” indicated that “at least some of the signatories experienced
or witnessed sexist behavior, bullying or other mistreatment in chambers . . . .” Kathryn Rubino, 70+ Former
Reinhardt Clerks Come Out in Support of Sexual Harassment Accuser, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 21, 2020),
https://abovethelaw.com/2020/02/reinhardt-clerks/.
As another recent example, consider the case of United States District Judge Carlos Murguia of the
District of Kansas. On September 30, 2019, Judge Murguia was reprimanded by the Judicial Council of the
Tenth Circuit for “sexually harassing female judiciary employees,” “having an affair with a felon that made
him ‘susceptible to extortion,’” and “for being ‘habitually late’ for court meetings.” Mihir Zaveri, Federal
Judge in Kansas City Is Reprimanded for Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/us/judge-carlos-murguia-sexual-harassment.html.
Chief Judge Tymkovich of the Tenth Circuit wrote in his disciplinary order that Judge Murguia
gave “preferential treatment and unwanted attention to female employees of the Judiciary in the form of
sexually suggestive comments, inappropriate text messages, and excessive, non-work-related contact, much of
which occurred after work hours and often late at night.” In Re: Complaint Under the Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act, No. 10-18-90022, 2 (Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 2019). The harassed employees
“stated that they were reluctant to tell Judge Murguia to cease his behavior because of the power he held as a
federal judge. One of the employees eventually told him explicitly to stop his harassing conduct, but he
continued.” Id. at 2–3.
Judge Tymkovich reported that Judge Murguia was “less than candid” during an investigation into
his alleged misconduct. Id. at 5. When Judge Murguia did apologize, his apologies “appeared more tied to his
regret that his actions were brought to light than an awareness of, and regret for, the harm he caused to the
individuals involved and to the integrity of his office.” Id. Judge Murguia will face no further punishment
from the council, which said that the reprimand was “[t]he most severe sanction available.” Id. at 6.
2
See infra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
3
See CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, 2017 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 11
(2017).
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of harassment in the third branch, one little-known bill appeared: the Judicial
Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2017.4 Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa
proposed this bill to identify and remedy the clandestine problem of judicial
harassment. This bill targeted an extraordinary problem by proposing an extraordinary
solution: the establishment of a judicial inspector general.
Harassment in the federal judiciary is particularly difficult to uncover because of
the power imbalance that exists between a life-tenured Article III judge and a
dispensable subordinate like a law clerk.5 Many law clerks are just beginning their
legal careers and are dependent on the judges for whom they clerk for favorable
recommendations to potential employers. This power imbalance could discourage
reporting by vulnerable victims. A judicial inspector general would counteract the
effects of this power imbalance by bringing to light cases of harassment that victims
might not feel empowered to report themselves.
While Senator Grassley’s bill would almost certainly effect positive change in the
judiciary, the policy question must nevertheless submit to the legal one: Is the bill
constitutional? To ask the constitutional question is to raise another perennially vexing
structural one, all the more salient in the #MeToo era: quis custodiet ipsos custodes
(“who watches the watchers”)? This Note argues that even under a rigorous
separation-of-powers analysis, a judicial inspector general is constitutional. Further,
because of the light shed by the #MeToo movement on the pervasiveness of sexual
harassment in the workplace, a judicial inspector general is not only a constitutional
solution to the dangers posed by judicial harassment; it is also a prudent one. To make
this argument, Parts I and II of this Note evaluate the history and implications of the
#MeToo Movement as well as the significant (and largely unresolved) issues the
movement raises concerning judicial misconduct. Part III considers the power of
Congress to regulate the federal courts and analyzes the constitutional issues raised by
the prospect of a judicial inspector general from formalist, functionalist, and practical
perspectives.
I.

THE HISTORY OF THE #METOO MOVEMENT, AND THE MOVE TOWARD
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

It all goes back to 2006. It was then that Tarana Burke, a survivor of sexual assault
who wanted to help fellow survivors, coined the phrase “Me Too”6—a phrase that is
now ingrained in the modern American lexicon. The movement’s true spark was lit
on October 5, 2017 by actress Ashley Judd’s bombshell claims that media mogul
Harvey Weinstein sexually harassed her and the subsequent disclosure of “allegations
4

Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2017, S. 2195, 115th Cong. (2017).
See Zaveri, supra note 1; Sharlene Koonce, #MeToo: Sexual Harassment in the Courtroom, AM. B.
ASS’N (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/appellate_issues/2019/winter/metoo-sexual-harass
ment-in-the-courtroom/; Dana Liebelson et al., Law Clerks Say Federal Judiciary Isn’t Equipped to Handle
Sexual Harassment, HUFFPOST (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/federal-court-clerk-sexualharassment-judges_n_5a3acf5ae4b025f99e1449f8.
6
Chicago Tribune, #MeToo: A Timeline of Events, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyle s/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html.
5
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against Mr. Weinstein stretching over nearly three decades.”7 Ten days after Judd’s
accusations, her spark ignited a cultural powder keg when Actress Alyssa Milano
resurrected the “Me Too” slogan by tweeting, “If you’ve been sexually harassed or
assaulted write ‘me too’ as a reply to this tweet.”8 Milano’s tweet effectively launched
the #MeToo Movement, which has contributed to the resignations of many prominent
businessmen, politicians, and media personalities up to the present day.9
Within a year, #MeToo accusations were directed at a prominent federal judge.
On December 8, 2017, Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit was accused of misconduct by six women including former law clerks and
externs.10 On December 15, The Washington Post published a story with allegations
against Judge Kozinski from nine more accusers. Among these accusers were law
students, a professor, some of Judge Kozinski’s colleagues, and a former judge.11 On
December 18, Judge Kozinski announced his immediate retirement, and he was
subsequently able to collect retirement payments.12
Modern efforts to ensure accountability for judicial misconduct began with the
enactment of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980.13 The Act authorizes
any person to file a complaint alleging that a federal judge has engaged in conduct
“prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts” or has become, by reason of a mental or physical disability, “unable to
discharge all the duties” of the judicial office.14 In enacting the statute, Congress
sought to provide “‘a fair and proper procedure whereby the Judicial Branch of the
Federal Government can keep its own house in order’ by identifying and correcting
instances of judicial misconduct and disability that do not involve impeachable
offenses.”15

7
Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for Decades,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassmentallegations.html?hp&action= click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=a-ledepackage-region&region=top-news&WT.nav =top-news.
8
@Alyssa_Milano, TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 4:21 PM),
https://twitter.com/alyssa_milano/status/9196594387006709 76?lang=en.
9
See Chicago Tribune, supra note 6.
10
Matt Zapotosky, Nine More Women Say Judge Subjected Them to Inappropriate Behavior, Including
Four Who
Say He Touched or Kissed Them, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nine-more-women-say-judge-subjected-themto-inappropr iate-behavior-including-four-who-say-he-touched-or-kissed-them/2017/12/15/8729b736-e10511e7-8679-a9728984 779c_story.html.
11
Id.
12
Matt Zapotosky, Federal Appeals Judge Announces Immediate Retirement Amid Probe of Sexual
Misconduct
Allegations, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/federal-appeals-judge-announces-immediate-retirement-amid-investigation-prompted-by-accusationsof-sexual-misconduct/2017/12 /18/6e38ada4-e3fd-11e7-a65d1ac0fd7f097e_story.html?utm_term=.491862d67e5f.
13
28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364 (2018).
14
Id. § 351.
15
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY WORKPLACE CONDUCT WORKING GROUP, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 28–29 (2018) (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-362 (1979), as reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4315, 4325).
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In a lecture in which he argued against the creation of a judicial inspector general,
Judge Scirica of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit provided a succinct
summary of the features of the 1980 Act:
Under the 1980 Act and the Rules, the process begins with a
complaint, which can be initiated by anyone. A complaint can also
be initiated by the chief circuit judge—an important change with
ramifications for a chief judge’s ability to act both formally and
informally. The chief judge then makes an initial inquiry and
determines whether the complaint should be dismissed or concluded
on the grounds of voluntary corrective action or because of
intervening events, or whether it presents questions of fact that
require further investigation. If questions of fact remain, the chief
circuit judge must appoint a special committee of judges to conduct
an investigation. The special committee then makes findings and
recommendations to the circuit judicial council on disposition and
any appropriate remedies or sanctions. Remedies or sanctions may
range from a reprimand or censure to a recommendation to Congress
to consider impeachment. A central purpose of the 1980 Act is to
provide transparency, so every order resolving a complaint must be
made public, and reprimands may be made public as well.16
In 2004, Chief Justice Rehnquist requested that a committee be formed to examine
the effectiveness of the Act. He pointed out that there “has been some recent criticism
from Congress about the way in which the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980
is being implemented.”17 Consequently, the Chief Justice created the Judicial Conduct
and Disability Act Study Committee. He asked the Committee to examine the Act’s
implementation—particularly in light of the recent criticism—and to report its findings
and any recommendations directly to him. Chief Justice John Roberts later asked the
Committee to continue its work. The Committee submitted a comprehensive report in
2006 that found “no serious problem with the judiciary’s handling of the vast bulk of
complaints under the Act” but recommended a number of changes in the Conduct
Rules to further enhance the effectiveness of the Act.18 The Judicial Conference’s
Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability drafted proposed changes, which the
Judicial Conference adopted.
In September 2006, the Committee presented its report, known as the Breyer
Committee Report.19 The report included numerous findings and recommendations.
For example, the Committee found that “[m]any courts do not use their websites to
provide the public with information about the Act [or] about how to file a complaint,”
16
Anthony J. Scirica, Judicial Governance and Judicial Independence, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 779, 787–88
(2015) (footnotes omitted).
17
THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMMITTEE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980 5 (2006).
18
Id. at 5.
19
See id. 5–6.
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and the Committee recommended that the Judicial Conference adopt policies that
would help “inform chief judges, judicial council members, and interested members
of the media and the public how chief judges and councils have terminated complaints
and why.”20
After 2006, little thought was given to judicial accountability until the Judge
Kozinski scandal broke on December 8, 2017. Thereafter, Chief Justice Roberts
established a working group to examine the judiciary’s procedures for protecting court
employees from judicial misconduct. In his 2017 annual report, the Chief Justice
wrote:
We have a new challenge in the coming year. Events in recent
months have illuminated the depth of the problem of sexual
harassment in the workplace, and events in the past few weeks have
made clear that the judicial branch is not immune. The judiciary will
begin 2018 by undertaking a careful evaluation of whether its
standards of conduct and its procedures for investigating and
correcting inappropriate behavior are adequate to ensure an
exemplary workplace for every judge and every court employee.21
In early 2018, James Duff, the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, formed the Federal Judiciary Workplace Conduct Working Group, which was
composed of eight judges and court administrators. In June 2018, the Working Group
released a report. The report concluded that while inappropriate workplace conduct is
not pervasive within the judiciary, it is not limited to a few isolated instances involving
law clerks.22 The Working Group asserted that misconduct, when it does occur, is
more likely to take the form of incivility or disrespect than overt sexual harassment,
and it frequently goes unreported.23 The report made three broad recommendations:
First, the Judiciary should revise its codes and other published
guidance in key respects to state clear and consistent standards,
delineate responsibilities, and promote appropriate workplace
behavior. Second, the Judiciary should improve its procedures for
identifying and correcting misconduct, strengthening, streamlining,
and making more uniform existing processes, as well as adding less
formal mechanisms for employees to seek advice and assistance.
Third, the Judiciary should supplement its educational and training
programs to raise awareness of conduct issues, prevent harassment,
and promote civility throughout the Judicial Branch.24

20

Id. at 6, 8.
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 11.
See THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY WORKPLACE CONDUCT WORKING GROUP, supra note 15, at 6–7.
23
Id. at 7.
24
Id. at 21.
21
22

Journal of Legislation

351

The advocacy group Law Clerks for Workplace Accountability (“LCWA”)
praised many aspects of the Working Group’s report, including its recommendation
that the Judicial Conference create a national Office of Judicial Integrity to serve as a
national resource for current and former judicial employees to seek advice regarding
how to formally or informally respond to workplace misconduct. LCWA also
criticized the report, however, claiming that its proposals were often vague.25
On June 13, 2018, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on sexual
harassment and other workplace misconduct in the federal judiciary. Three witnesses
testified at this hearing: James Duff, the Director of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts; Jaime Santos, an associate at Goodwin Procter LLP; and Jenny Yang, a
strategic partner at Working Ideal—an organization that provides advice on how
organizations can become more inclusive.26
Director Duff largely defended the Working Group’s report. He argued that the
judiciary’s existing procedures for reporting and addressing harassment work
effectively; the problem is that judiciary employees are often unaware of the existence
of such procedures or are confused about how to take advantage of them.27 In contrast,
Ms. Santos argued that the Working Group’s report “does not go far enough” because
“many of its recommendations are still quite vague.”28 She highlighted additional steps
that must be taken to effect lasting change. For example, noting that “the [W]orking
[G]roup’s report is [almost] entirely forward-looking,” Ms. Santos called for a study
of judicial “employees’ past experiences with harassment or abusive behavior.”29
Similarly critical, Ms. Yang pointed out “the lack of a full Article III judicial remedy
or any external review or outside appeal process” for claims of harassment in the
judiciary.30 She recommended that “the judiciary explore holding itself to the same
standards as all other employers by providing employees with the right to a jury trial
and the ability to obtain compensatory damages which are often the only remedy
available in harassment cases.”31
In response to the Working Group’s report, the Judicial Conference published
changes to the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges and the Judicial Conduct and
Disability Rules in September 2018.32 For example:
Revised Canon 3 provides that judges “should not engage in behavior
that is harassing, abusive, prejudiced, or biased.” The Rules define
cognizable misconduct as including “engaging in unwanted,
offensive, or abusive sexual conduct, including sexual harassment or
assault.” Finally, Canon 3 now states that judges should take
25
See Brooke D. Coleman, Accountability Requires Tenacity, JOTWELL (Apr. 23, 2019),
https://courtslaw.jotwell. com/accountability-requires-tenacity/.
26
See Confronting Sexual Harassment and Other Workplace Misconduct in the Federal Judiciary:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018) [hereinafter Hearing].
27
See id. at 17 (statement of James Duff, Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
28
Id. at 22 (statement of Jaime Santos, Associate, Goodwin Procter LLP).
29
Id. at 23.
30
Id. at 28 (statement of Jenny Yang, Strategic Partner, Working Ideal).
31
Id.
32
See Coleman, supra note 25.
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appropriate action when learning of these types of behaviors, whether
that behavior be from a fellow judge, a court employee, or lawyer.33
Finally, in his 2018 Year-End Report, Chief Justice Roberts again addressed the
judiciary’s efforts to end “inappropriate conduct in the workplace.”34 He provided an
update on the Working Group’s report, the revised Code and Rules, and the new
Federal Judicial Center Training materials. Recognizing that there is more to be done,
the Chief Justice stated that “[t]he job is not finished until we have done all that we
can to ensure that all of our employees are treated with fairness, dignity, and respect.”35
II.

ISSUES THAT REMAIN UNRESOLVED AND QUESTIONS THAT REMAIN
UNANSWERED

Although progress has been made toward establishing institutional safeguards that
will prevent judges from harassing subordinates, there is still much more work to be
done. In the world outside the judiciary, the #MeToo Movement is charging ahead.
Within the walls of the third branch, however, change has been modest and slow going.
Many questions raised and many problems presented by judicial harassment have not
been given sufficient attention. At least as long as the issues discussed below remain
unresolved, a judicial inspector general would—and should—play a role in policing
judicial misconduct. While it is unlikely that all of these problems can be solved by a
single legal solution, the establishment of a judicial inspector general would alleviate
at least some of the detrimental consequences created by these problems as further
solutions are explored.
First, neither the judiciary nor Congress have conducted a broad study of the
problem of harassment in the judiciary. During the Senate Judiciary Committee’s
hearing on judicial harassment, Ms. Santos testified, “I know of [f]ederal judges who
have been sitting on the bench in the last several months who have, it is commonly
known, engaged in [harassing] behavior. . . . Within the past several months, they have
done it.”36 Motivated by reports of such harassment, Ms. Yang and Ms. Santos have
called for a national, retrospective survey of judicial employees to determine the
prevalence of harassment in the judiciary. At the hearing, Ms. Santos stated, “I do not
share the [W]orking [G]roup’s conclusion that [harassment] is not pervasive in the
judiciary. I do not think the judiciary has any idea. We have recommended that the
[W]orking [G]roup do a survey of law clerks and other employees . . . .”37
Senator Dianne Feinstein of California has likewise addressed the need for a study
on the extent of harassment in the judiciary. She has noted that such a study is
important because “in 2016 not one claim was filed under the current process for
reporting within the Judiciary Conduct Act, even though over 700 clerks signed a letter
33
Id. (quoting CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3 (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S. 2019)). Coleman’s article also describes some “critical shortcomings” of the revisions.
34
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, 2018 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 10 (2018).
35
Id.
36
Hearing, supra note 26, at 69 (statement of Jaime Santos, Associate, Goodwin Procter LLP).
37
Id. at 61.
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raising concerns and several high-profile cases of harassment came to light.”38
Director Duff has opposed such a survey, preferring instead to prospectively focus on
how the judiciary can change its policies to protect future potential victims.
Similarly, it is uncertain how pervasive harassment is in the legal profession
generally, such as in law firms. Ms. Santos, in response to a question for the record,
stated:
In my view, sexual harassment is a significant problem within the
legal profession more generally, just as it is a problem within the
entertainment industry, the media industry, and within the halls of
Congress. One thing these industries all have in common is the
concentration of men in positions of power, which can allow
harassment to thrive and be concealed.39
There is also a need for more input from current and former law clerks. In
responding to a question for the record asked by Minnesota Senator Amy Klobuchar,
Ms. Santos insisted that more input from former law clerks is needed because “even
well-intentioned judges and judicial executives cannot be expected to recognize their
own blind spots, especially when they are on the powerful end of a disparate power
dynamic.”40 Ms. Santos lamented that law clerks were not included as formal members
of the Working Group.41
It is unclear what role law schools play in informing students about and preventing
judicial harassment. To provide clarity on this issue, law school deans, professors, and
administrators should explain how they can help law clerks avoid and respond to
harassment. With regard to rumors that law school officials sometimes hear about
judicial harassment, Director Duff has stated that “working with the law schools and
learning more about [harassment]” is important “because sometimes we are not as fully
aware of the rumors out there within the branch as maybe we should be.”42 Director
Duff has said that collaboration with law schools is important because “in some cases
the schools may possess informal knowledge that is not always communicated to the
proper channels in the Judiciary.”43
Problems have also been caused because of the public’s general inability to access
records concerning judicial misconduct. A CNN investigation reported that records
on judicial misconduct are not searchable and thus not easily accessible to the public.44
Director Duff has said that “the Working Group encourages individual circuits to seek
ways to make decisions on complaints in their courts more readily accessible to the
38

Id. at 11 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 115TH CONG., JAIME A. SANTOS’ RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FOR THE
RECORD 8 (2018) [hereinafter SANTOS QFR].
40
Id. at 15 (referring to the relationship between judges and law clerks).
41
See id.
42
Hearing, supra note 26, at 44 (statement of James Duff, Director, Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts).
43
S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 115TH CONG., JAMES C. DUFF’S RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FOR THE
RECORD 12 (2018) [hereinafter DUFF QFR].
44
See Joan Biskupic, CNN Investigation: Sexual Misconduct by Judges Kept Under Wraps, CNN (Jan.
26, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/25/politics/courts-judges-sexual-harassment/index.html.
39
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public through searchable electronic databases.”45 Similarly, Ms. Yang has
encouraged the judiciary to issue “an annual report summarizing judicial discipline
decisions by issue and court [in order to] make this information accessible to the
public.”46 The lack of transparency on these matters hampers the ability of the public
and media to hold judges accountable by exposing their misconduct, increasing the
need for a judicial inspector general.
Similarly, complaints of judicial misconduct are generally not made public in the
first place. As Ms. Yang has explained:
Currently, victims of harassment in the Judiciary . . . must utilize an
internal complaint process that . . . is unlikely to lead to disciplinary
action. Unlike all other federal and private sector employees, judicial
employees have . . . no right to ensure public sunshine on their
complaints.47
Ms. Yang has concluded that the general lack of remedies for victims of judicial
harassment, including the lack of an effective mechanism to hold harassers
accountable, creates “a substantial deterrent for employees to come forward to report
discrimination.”48 A judicial inspector general would facilitate public consequences
for harassers and thus encourage victims to report misconduct.
Of significant concern is how the harassment of a law clerk at the hands of his or
her judge can be logistically difficult to address. Director Duff has explained:
Reassignment is possible [after the harassment occurs], but judges
vary in terms of reputation and ideological background. The power
disparity between a judge and a law clerk may create a strong
disincentive to report any inappropriate conduct by a judge. A law
clerk may fear that any complaint will destroy the bond of trust and
cause strife in the chambers. It may also impact the judge’s
recommendations for the law clerk which could impact future job
prospects.49
While there is no easy solution to this problem, a judicial inspector general would at
least confirm claims of harassment found to be valid through investigation (thus
preserving the law clerk’s reputation for integrity) and prevent the harassing judge
from threatening to derail the law clerk’s career if misdeeds are reported.
Importantly, there are problems inherent in a system where judges report and
investigate other judges. As Ms. Santos has explained:

45

DUFF QFR, supra note 43, at 21.
S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 115TH CONG., JENNY R. YANG’S RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FOR THE
RECORD 13 (2018) [hereinafter YANG QFR].
47
Id. at 4.
48
Id.
49
DUFF QFR, supra note 43, at 20.
46
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If an employee experiences harassment or misconduct by a judge, the
knowledge that the report will be referred to another judge for
investigation and resolution could discourage employees from
reporting misconduct . . . . Indeed, the lack of virtually any official
complaints of harassment by judges is perhaps the best illustration
that this process discourages reporting . . . . The Working Group has
not yet focused on the procedures for investigating allegations of
harassment, but in my view, this issue is a crucial if the judiciary
hopes to be effective in encouraging reporting.50
Similarly, Ms. Yang has stated,
[T]he chief judge is a peer of an accused judge who may
understandably tend to give valued colleagues the benefit of the doubt
when evaluating whether they have engaged in harassing behavior.
This process could certainly deter individuals from coming forward
out of a concern that they will not be believed or appropriate
disciplinary action will not be taken. Indeed, the current process
garners strikingly few complaints as compared with anecdotal reports
of harassment.51
Conversely, Judge Scirica has insisted that ideals of judicial stewardship are
enough to encourage judges to investigate other judges in an honest, unbiased way.
He has explained:
The process now in place requires discipline, rigor, and selfassessment, seen in the searching inquiry now undertaken by the
chief circuit judges and circuit judicial councils. The judges who
make these decisions feel an acute responsibility for this essential and
sensitive job: soundly exercising discretion on matters of personal
and institutional importance. They balance the legitimate competing
interests, but overall they must ensure and maintain public
confidence in the integrity of a court's decisions, in the judiciary as
an institution, and also in its principal actors—the judges themselves.
The judges charged with this duty understand they act as stewards for
an essential institution. Of course stewards have to be worthy of the
task. This centrality of stewardship would be greatly diminished
under an inspector general regime.52
As sympathetic as one may be to Judge Scirica’s admirable ideals, the #MeToo
Movement has caused the public to question whether those in power may sufficiently
regulate themselves. It is worth noting that Judge Scirica gave the lecture from which
50

SANTOS QFR, supra note 39, at 11.
YANG QFR, supra note 46, at 7.
52
Scirica, supra note 16, at 795–96.
51
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the statement above was taken in 2015 before the #MeToo Movement began. At that
time, Judge Scirica believed that “there is no need to create constitutional tension”
because “[t]he judiciary is faithfully discharging its duties of accountability.”53 The
numerous allegations of judicial misconduct that have come to light since 2015 bring
Judge Scirica’s assertion into question. Given the revelations of the #MeToo
Movement, an independent inspector general, immune from intra-branch judicial
pressures, would naturally be the best investigator of judges accused of misconduct.
Despite calls for the establishment of a national reporting system for victims of
judicial harassment to utilize at a safe distance from their alleged harassers, there is
currently no such system in place. Ms. Santos has argued that a “national reporting
avenue would ensure that employees in smaller districts or circuits—where all local
employees know each other well—are not siloed into reporting to someone who may
be close to the accused harasser.”54 Similarly, Senator Grassley, as the Chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated:
[T]he [Working Group’s] report did not recommend establishing a
national reporting mechanism, so it leaves victims no other avenue
except to report to chief judges of their local district or circuit courts.
This is a major issue because law clerks may be intimidated by
reporting to a local chief judge instead of an independent national
office.55
Director Duff is not in favor of such a national reporting system because he
believes that the newly established Office of Judicial Integrity, which will “counsel
and advise callers and potential complainants on all their options early in the process
as well as facilitate informal resolution of issues,”56 will play a comparable role.
However, a judicial inspector general could bridge the gap and carry out the functions
of both a national reporting system and an informal dispute resolution resource.
The position of Director Duff and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
(“AO”) is that, ultimately, ignorance of remedial options is what leads to the scarce
reporting of judicial misconduct.57 The accuracy of this position is disputed. During
the hearing on judicial harassment, Ms. Santos stated:
I would like to . . . respond to . . . something [Director] Duff has said
several times, which is that people are not reporting this because they
are not educated about it. I just really disagree with that point. I think
that that is a piece of it. Education is important. But I know many
women who went to HR and tried to report it and were discouraged
from doing so. They were told that if this gets reported, it is going to
53
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go up to the chief judge, and he is really good friends with the person
you are talking about.58
The establishment of a judicial inspector general solves both of the issues raised by
Director Duff and Ms. Santos, regardless of which one is the “true” fundamental
problem. As a neutral party independent of the judicial branch, an inspector general
could supplement the AO’s educational efforts at the same time that he or she
encourages victims to report misconduct when they come forward.
Additionally, there are issues related to a judge’s retirement in the midst of an
investigation. Normally, if a judge retires during an investigation of the judge’s
alleged harassment, the investigation ends.59 And the judge’s retirement pay will be
the same amount that he or she would have made on the bench.60 During the hearing
on harassment in the judiciary, Senator Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut asked
Director Duff, “[s]houldn’t the judiciary continue to pursue [judges accused of
harassment who have retired] and have jurisdiction to stop that person’s pay . . . ?”61
A judicial inspector general could be given such authority.
A judicial inspector general could also provide official governmental affirmation
that the problem of judicial harassment is serious and not something that should be
disregarded or minimized. In response to a question for the record, Ms. Yang stated,
“[w]here leadership is male dominated [as it is in the federal courts], women may not
feel comfortable coming forward with concerns of sexual harassment for fear that these
problems may be minimized.”62 The establishment of a judicial inspector general
would send the message that the problem of judicial harassment is serious and will not
be dismissed. This would both reassure the public and deter future judicial harassment.
It is clear from the foregoing that a judicial inspector general would address many
of the problems posed by harassment in the judiciary. It would, therefore, be prudent
to establish such an inspector general, especially given how the #MeToo Movement
has exposed the prevalence of sexual harassment in society. Regardless, is a judicial
inspector general a constitutional solution to the problem of harassment in the
judiciary?
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A JUDICIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
A.

CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS

An important background principle to keep in mind is that Article I of the United
States Constitution not only concerns the nature and powers of Congress but also the
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“overall powers of the Federal Government.”63 This is perhaps revealed most clearly
in the Necessary and Proper Clause, which empowers Congress to legislate in order to
execute “all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States or in any department or officer thereof.”64 Further, while Article III vests the
judicial power in one Supreme Court, “nothing else about [the judiciary’s] structure
and its operation is specified . . . .”65 Thus, it appears to be Congress’ prerogative to
“fill out the powers conferred on the Executive and Judiciary.”66 Pursuant to this
prerogative, Congress may have the authority to appoint an inspector general to
investigate judicial misconduct. James Duff, the Director of the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts, has described an apparent precedent for such an inspector general,
stating, “In 1984 . . . in the Administrative Office of the Courts, [there] was [an office]
called the ‘Office of Inspector General.’ Chief Justice Burger instituted that with
Director Foley of the AO.”67
The Congressional Research Service has concluded that “Congress has significant
authority over administration of the judicial system . . . .”68 In the past, Congress has
regulated several aspects of the federal courts. It has funded the courts’ operation
(including judicial salaries) through its spending power, and—by statute—it
established the AO, the judicial councils of the circuits, the judicial conferences of the
circuits, and the Judicial Conference of the United States.69 Congress has also
delegated a significant portion of its authority to make rules for the courts to the courts
themselves. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, for example, Congress gave the federal
courts the power “to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting
of business in [the] courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the
United States.”70 This grant of power to the judiciary implies that Congress retained
the power originally, which is further evidence of the authority that Congress has to
regulate the courts under the Constitution. Similarly, the management of judicial
discipline was established by the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,71 by
which Congress sought to provide “a fair and proper procedure whereby the Judicial
Branch of the Federal Government can keep its own house in order” by identifying and
correcting instances of judicial misconduct that do not rise to the level of impeachable
offenses.72 From 1789 to 1980, Congress has regulated, or has allowed the courts to
regulate, the administration of the federal judiciary.
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Given the significant authority that Congress has to regulate the judiciary, some
scholars have argued that “[t]here are no well-accepted arguments supporting the
proposition that the judiciary has, or should have, as a branch, the level of
independence in its administration that individual judges have in their judicial
decisionmaking.”73 Such scholars typically distinguish “decisional independence,”
which is defined as “the ability of a judge to make a legal decision unfettered by the
threat of coercion,” from “administrative” or “institutional” independence, which is
defined as “the ability of the judiciary to administer itself according to systems it
establishes.”74 From this distinction follows the conclusion that “while [c]onstitutional
protections exist to protect ‘decisional independence,’ they do not exist for
‘administrative’ independence.”75
Decisional independence cannot be compromised in any way, for it is inherently
connected to the legitimacy of the rule of law and thus the functioning of democratic
self-government. As Judge Scirica has explained, decisional judicial independence
is essential to our concept of procedural due process and is codified
in the Constitution's insulation of judges from political pressures
through life tenure and nondiminution of salary. Deference to the
judgment and rulings of the courts depends on public confidence that
those decisions were based on the law and the facts. Even with its
coercive powers, the judiciary for the most part relies on voluntary
compliance with its directives.76
In contrast to decisional independence, Judge Scirica has pointed out that
institutional independence is not absolute. The Constitution
empowers Congress to create and regulate the lower federal courts.
In doing so, Congress has granted self-regulatory power to the
judiciary itself, while retaining an oversight role.
This
accommodation has preserved accountability in a way that insulates
judges from political pressures and interference, but that also depends
on a partnership between the branches in cultivating judicial selfgovernance.77
Thus, unlike decisional independence, institutional independence can be reduced to
some extent to ensure judicial accountability.
Assuming that judicial independence is not impermissibly affected, the benefits to
be gained from the creation of a judicial inspector general demonstrate the value of
Senator Grassley’s bill and why it should become law. First of all, the bill would allow
73
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Congress to better oversee the conduct of the federal judiciary. As an example of the
benefits that such oversight can produce, consider how after Congress enacted the Civil
Justice Reform Act,78 it was discovered that a federal district court judge had fifty-five
cases that had been pending more than three years and one case in which the parties
had been waiting eleven years for a decision.79
Furthermore, as Diane Hartmus recognized in 1999, the “appointment of an
[inspector general] in the judiciary, properly publicized, could be an important step
toward stemming growing public distrust of judicial accountability.”80 If that were
true in 1999, long before the #MeToo Movement and the Judge Kozinski scandal, it is
even more true now. Hartmus noted that “because an [inspector general] is required
to file reports with Congress on a regular basis which are available to the public, the
courts would thus provide the public with an increased ability to monitor and
understand the workings of the judiciary.”81 Because the public’s trust in public
institutions has eroded significantly in the wake of the #MeToo Movement and other
public scandals, the investigations (and mere existence) of a judicial inspector general
would demonstrate to the public that the judiciary is able and willing to be held
accountable.
Others have argued that the creation of a judicial inspector general impermissibly
intrudes upon judicial independence, upsetting the fragile balance of power between
Congress and the judiciary. Judge Scirica has championed such a position:
[The introduction of bills supporting the creation a judicial inspector
general] mark[s] a troubling shift . . . toward a system that would give
power to an inspector general and, in turn, to Congress. The office
of a judicial inspector general . . . could be misused to retaliate
against judges who made unpopular decisions. In addition, the
comparison of the proposed inspector general to the offices of
inspector general in executive agencies [is] flawed because the
judiciary “lacks the power to push back if Congress erodes” its
independence. An inspector general in the executive branch would
“straddle a barbed-wire fence” between the executive and legislative
branches, which jockey for power, but no barbed-wire fence exists to
protect the judiciary from congressional overreach.82
Similarly, Eric Robbins has argued:
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Because judges can be disciplined for acts that create the appearance
of impropriety, a necessarily vague standard, whomever disciplines
judges has a great deal of discretion. Because of their experience on
the bench and insulation from political pressure, judges are better
equipped to determine what behavior they are willing to tolerate
within their own ranks.83
However, Senator Grassley’s bill would give the Chief Justice of the United States
the authority to remove the judicial inspector general at will, so the judiciary would be
able to “push back” if the inspector general abused his power or discretion in some
way. Further, the mere possibility that authority may be abused is typically no reason
to abstain from creating the authority in the first place (at least as long as proper
safeguards, such as appointment and removal provisions, are in place). Ultimately,
given Congress’ significant authority to oversee the federal judiciary, and considering
the pressing need to ensure greater accountability in the #MeToo era, it is clear that
the concerns raised by Robbins and Judge Scirica are not enough to preclude the
creation of a judicial inspector general.
B.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE JUDICIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

Senator Grassley’s bill would authorize a judicial inspector general to “make
investigations and reports.”84 During an investigation, the inspector general would be
authorized to obtain information from federal, state, and local governmental
agencies.85 The inspector general would wield a subpoena power in order to compel
the testimony of witnesses and the production of “books, records, correspondence,
memoranda, papers, and documents.”86 Finally, the inspector general would be
authorized to administer oaths, affirmations, and affidavits.87
However, the judicial inspector general would be specifically prohibited from
investigating or reviewing “any matter that is directly related to the merits of a decision
or procedural ruling by any judge, justice, or court,” and would have no authority to
“punish or discipline any judge, justice, or court.”88 As Donald Campbell has
recognized, provisions like these are “meant to ensure the independence of the
judiciary.”89 The bill would authorize the inspector general to commence
investigations in only certain situations:
The Inspector General shall not commence an investigation under
section 1023(1) until the denial of a petition for review by the judicial
83
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council of the circuit under section 352(c) of [Title 28] or upon
referral or certification to the Judicial Conference of the United States
of any matter under section 354(b) of [Title 28].90
Thus, the inspector general would not be authorized to initiate investigations of his
own accord; rather, he would have to wait for a denial of a petition for review or for a
matter to be referred or certified.91 Consequently, the judicial inspector general’s
authority would be limited from the outset.
The judicial inspector general’s limited authority under Senator Grassley’s bill
addresses many concerns raised by critics of past efforts to establish a judicial
inspector general. For example, Diane Hartmus criticized a bill proposed by Senator
John McCain of Arizona to create a judicial inspector general on the grounds that the
bill gave to the judicial inspector general an “unfettered grant of investigative power
over judges.”92 In fact, Hartmus complained that Senator McCain’s bill “[did] not
address an [inspector general’s] investigative authority in any manner.”93 Hartmus
proposed ways to constrain a judicial inspector general’s authority and explained how
these limitations are essential to maintaining an independent judiciary:
The investigative jurisdiction of the [inspector general] into
allegations of judicial misconduct should be limited. Specifically, an
[inspector general] should become involved in investigations of
judicial misconduct only at the invitation of either the chief judge of
the circuit, or any other judicial body involved in the discipline
procedure. Furthermore, an [inspector general] should have no
authority to review, or even comment on, the substance of court
decisions. Without these limitations, the creation of an office of
[inspector general] with the authority to investigate a particular judge
on a complaint of judicial misconduct, or review the content of
judicial opinions, threatens the concept of judicial independence that
is the cornerstone of our democracy and the foundation of a fair,
impartial judiciary.94
By the limitations it imposes on the authority of the judicial inspector general,
Senator Grassley’s bill satisfies Hartmus’ concerns. Further, because the judicial
council may refer or certify a matter to the judicial conference and thereby authorize
the inspector general to investigate the matter, the judicial council has “the option to
90
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call upon the investigative skills of the [inspector general] in matters deemed
appropriate for investigation by someone other than a fellow judge.”95 As Hartmus
notes, “allegations that involve personnel issues or administrative irregularities are best
investigated by an [inspector general], while issues related to judicial decisionmaking
or courtroom demeanor are probably best left to fellow judges.”96 Thus, Senator
Grassley’s bill—unlike the previous bill proposed by Senator McCain—would grant a
judicial inspector general only limited powers. This would preserve the independence
of the judicial branch while holding judges accountable in a way that is appropriate
and effective.
C.

APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL

Senator Grassley’s bill requires the Chief Justice of the United States to appoint a
judicial inspector general.97 The bill also authorizes the Chief Justice to remove the
judicial inspector general for any reason; the Chief Justice must only communicate the
reasons for removal to the House and Senate.98 Thus, one may ask: Are the
appointment and removal powers Congress has over executive officials analogous to
the appointment and removal powers it has over judicial officials such as a judicial
inspector general? A foundational inquiry is whether a judicial inspector general is a
principal or inferior officer under Article II of the Constitution. Principal officers must
be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, but Congress may direct
the President, department heads, or a court of law to appoint inferior officers.99
In Morrison v. Olson,100 the Supreme Court did not establish a bright-line rule for
distinguishing between principal and inferior officers, but considered several factors
before concluding that an independent counsel is an inferior officer.101 The following
factors were considered: the independent counsel could be removed by a higher
executive branch official; the independent counsel was authorized to perform only
certain, limited duties and had no policy-making authority; and the independent
counsel had limited jurisdiction and tenure.102 In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co.
Accounting Oversight Board,103 the Court adopted the “subordinate test”: whether one
is an inferior officer “depends on whether he has a superior,” and inferior officers are
officers “whose work is directed and supervised at some level” by “other officers
appointed by the President with the Senate's consent.”104
Under both the Morrison and Free Enterprise Fund tests, it appears that a judicial
inspector general would be an inferior officer. The judicial inspector general would
be supervised by the Chief Justice, who is appointed by the President and confirmed
95
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by the Senate. Under Senator Grassley’s bill, the inspector general would have a
limited tenure of four years (although he may be reappointed by the Chief Justice for
any number of additional terms).105 Further, the inspector general has no authority to
make policy for the judicial branch, although he would be allowed to recommend
changes in laws or regulations governing the judicial branch.106 Finally, the inspector
general’s jurisdiction and duties would be limited: He would only possess the authority
to conduct investigations of alleged misconduct in the judicial branch, and he would
only be able to commence an investigation after the denial of a petition for review or
after a matter has been referred or certified to the Judicial Conference of the United
States.107 For these reasons, it appears that the inspector general would be an inferior
officer who could be appointed by a court of law.
In Morrison, the Supreme Court allowed Congress to vest the power to appoint an
independent counsel in a court.108 To determine if this vesting of the appointment
power was constitutional, the Court looked for “incongruity”— the connection
between the appointer and the appointee.109 In Morrison, the Court concluded that
there was sufficient congruity in having a court appoint a prosecutor and investigator:
Such a relationship was congruent because investigations and prosecutions typically
occur under judicial supervision.110 In the case of a judicial inspector general, a similar
outcome would be expected because discovering judicial misconduct and facilitating
the judicial disciplinary process (the judicial inspector general’s task) has traditionally
been one of the tasks of the Chief Justice. Thus, the Supreme Court would probably
find sufficient congruity in having the Chief Justice appoint an inspector general for
the federal courts.
While Senator Grassley’s bill does not restrict the Chief Justice’s ability to remove
the inspector general, it is worth considering whether a future bill could do so. In
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,111 the Supreme Court stated:
The authority of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative or quasijudicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties
independently of executive control cannot well be doubted; and that
authority includes, as an appropriate incident, power to fix the period
during which they shall continue in office, and to forbid their removal
except for cause in the meantime.112
Humphrey’s held that if an agency is not executing the law, then restricting the
President’s power to remove officers within the agency will not hinder the President’s
ability to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.113 Would this same rationale
105
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apply to the judicial branch and to a judicial inspector general? If the inspector general
is not exercising the judicial power, would restricting the Chief Justice’s power to
remove the inspector general be constitutional on the ground that the Chief Justice’s
ability to exercise the judicial power would not be hindered? Considering Humphrey’s
reasoning, an affirmative answer seems likely.
The appointment provision in Senator Grassley’s bill addresses concerns that
critics of past bills have raised. For instance, Diane Hartmus has argued that the
judicial inspector general bill introduced by Senator McCain contained a “glaring
error” because it required the judicial inspector general to be “chosen by the President
from a list of individuals submitted by the Judicial Conference of the United States.”114
Hartmus argued:
By requiring the [inspector general] . . . to be a presidential
appointee, Senator McCain's bill infringes on the separation of
powers doctrine. Because the judiciary is an independent branch of
government, the appointment process for an [inspector general]
should parallel, not copy, that of the Executive branch. The Chief
Justice, the leader of the judiciary, should appoint the [inspector
general] for the courts, with the advice and consent of the Senate.115
Senator Grassley’s bill properly takes Hartmus’ separation-of-powers concern into
account by authorizing the Chief Justice to appoint the judicial inspector general and
by allowing the Chief Justice to remove the inspector general at will. As Donald
Campbell has noted, bills like Senator Grassley’s give “the Chief Justice a great deal
of authority in hiring and firing the judicial inspector general.”116
Similarly, the removal provision that authorizes the Chief Justice to remove the
judicial inspector general for any reason satisfies criticism of past bills. In discussing
Senator McCain’s judicial inspector general bill, Hartmus argued that “[t]he Chief
Justice alone should have the power to remove the [inspector general], communicating
the reasons for removal to the Senate.”117 Senator Grassley’s bill does exactly that.
Incidentally, Senator Grassley’s bill also incentivizes offending judges to “remove”
themselves. By facilitating the discovery of judicial misconduct, the judicial inspector
general puts informal pressure on exposed judges to resign. As Hartmus has noted,
“given the [c]onstitutional salary and tenure protections afforded federal judges, peer
pressure is perhaps the most effective method of handling incidents of misconduct
among federal judges.”118
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FUNCTIONALISM, FORMALISM, AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The establishment of a judicial inspector general who will investigate judicial
misconduct and report to Congress raises questions about the separation of powers and
judicial independence. As noted by scholars, “[t]ension between the branches over the
administrative operations of the judiciary is ongoing,” and “[t]he exact location of the
line between judicial independence and congressional oversight of the judiciary has
never been firmly established.”119 Further, as the discussion below demonstrates, there
is no agreement concerning what methodological approach the courts should take
when analyzing separation-of-powers issues. Thus, the separation-of-powers
problems posed by a judicial inspector general should be addressed from as many
perspectives as possible.
When deciding separation-of-powers cases, the Supreme Court has taken
formalist, functionalist, and practical approaches. At root, the Court evaluates whether
the acting branch, which is usually Congress, has “impermissibly undermine[d]” the
power of another branch.120 Specifically, the Court considers whether the acting
branch has “disrupt[ed] the proper balance between the coordinate branches [by]
preventing the [other] [b]ranch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions.”121 In conducting this inquiry, courts and judges have emphasized different
formalist, functionalist, and practical considerations.
i. Functionalism
A functionalist approach “focuses upon the preservation of the core functions of
the three branches, looking in a given case to whether the exercise of power by one
branch impinges upon a core function of a coordinate branch.”122 For example, in
United States v. Nixon,123 President Nixon was named as a co-conspirator in various
criminal charges, and the district court subpoenaed tapes and documents relating to
specific meetings involving Nixon. In opposition to the subpoena, Nixon asserted a
claim of absolute privilege.124 In approaching the case, the Supreme Court sought to
ensure that the functions of the judicial and executive branches worked properly.125
The Court weighed the importance of a general claim of confidentiality against the fair
administration of criminal justice and concluded that the legitimate needs of the
judicial process outweighed the broad claim of presidential privilege.126 The Court
reasoned that the President’s general interest in confidentiality would not be vitiated
by disclosure of a limited number of conversations “preliminarily shown to have some

119

Hartmus, supra note 73, at 254.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986)).
121
Id. (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
122
BAZAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 11.
123
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
124
See id. at 703.
125
See id. at 707.
126
See id. at 707–14.
120

Journal of Legislation

367

bearing on the pending criminal cases.”127 This disclosure would also ensure that the
judiciary would be able to carry out its Article III task of adjudicating federal criminal
prosecutions.128 Thus, because disclosure of the documents would preserve the
functions of both the executive and judicial branches, disclosure was allowed.
Following Nixon’s functionalist approach, an analysis of Senator Grassley’s bill
would involve a balancing of the judicial and legislative interests. A court would ask
whether the appointment of a judicial inspector general would impair the judiciary’s
efforts to exercise the judicial power and whether allowing or disallowing the creation
of a judicial inspector general would impair the efforts of Congress to exercise its
constitutional powers. The court would then attempt to resolve the case in a way that
allows both the judiciary and the legislature to exercise their core constitutional
functions.
On the face of Senator Grassley’s bill, it does not appear that the inspector general
is given any authority that would interfere with the exercise of the judicial power,
which has been defined as “the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment
and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before it for
decision.”129 The inspector general would merely be empowered to conduct
investigations and create reports in order to facilitate either punishment within the
judicial branch or impeachment by the legislative branch. The facilitation of either
action would not interfere with the exercise of the judicial power, and neither action
poses a constitutional problem: The former has been statutorily authorized by Congress
(and the judiciary does not protest the practice), and the latter is eminently
constitutional.130
As Hartmus points out, it could be argued that “the mere presence of an [inspector
general], with unfettered investigatory powers, would be chilling to judicial
independence” because the judiciary “is founded upon the belief that judges must
remain free from outside pressure, political or otherwise, in rendering decisions in the
cases before them.”131 However, the solution to this potential problem is to “not grant[]
[inspectors general] the power to investigate a judge’s ‘every move.’”132 In particular,
a judge’s decision-making should not be investigated by a judicial inspector general.
Because Senator Grassley’s bill would specifically prohibit a judicial inspector general
from investigating judicial decision-making, judges’ decisions are protected from
investigation, which should prevent any chilling of judicial independence.
ii. Formalism
A formalist approach to a separation-of-powers issue “examines the text of the
Constitution to determine the degree to which branch powers and functions may be
intermingled, emphasizing that powers committed by the Constitution to a particular
127
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branch are to be exercised exclusively by that branch.”133 One performing a formalist
analysis may locate Congress’ authority to establish a judicial inspector general in the
Necessary and Proper Clause.134 In order for Congress to exercise its impeachment
power,135 it must first learn of impeachable offenses. However, judicial harassment is
often difficult to uncover because of the stark power disparity that exists between lifetenured federal judges and vulnerable judicial employees, such as law clerks.136 Thus,
for Congress to impeach judges who are secretly engaging in harassing behavior, the
investigations of an inspector general may be necessary. Further, there would be no
usurpation of the judicial power because the judicial inspector general would not
decide cases or interfere with judicial decision-making,137 and there would be no
usurpation of executive power because the judicial inspector general would only
conduct investigations—a principal function of Congress.138
In opposition, Judge Scirica has insisted that a judicial inspector general would
indeed encroach upon the formal powers of the judiciary. He has argued:
Historically, Congress has formally reviewed the conduct of
individual judges only when considering impeachable offenses. But
the inspector general bill is designed to reach conduct that does not
rise to impeachment. When a political branch of government can
direct or influence these investigations, judges are no longer insulated
from encroachment, and the judiciary's ability to check the power
exercised by the executive and legislative branches may be
undermined.139
Judge Scirica rejects the argument that “life tenure and protection of salary [would] be
sufficient to shield the judiciary from real coercion,” insisting that “[a]ny outside
influence on the judicial conduct and disability process contains the seeds for improper
pressure and persuasion.”140
This argument is unpersuasive, however, because Judge Scirica does not explain
how Congress would be able to “direct or influence” the investigations of the judicial
inspector general. This assertion is questionable, at least under Senator Grassley’s bill,
since the inspector general’s authority would be carefully constrained and the Chief
Justice of the United States would be authorized to remove the inspector general at
will. The removal provision alone appears to be an adequate safeguard against
133
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politically motivated investigations. Judge Scirica’s argument is further undermined
by his recognition that “the proposed mandate of the inspector general would duplicate
the existing judicial conduct and disability process in several ways.”141 If the current
process does not intrude upon the independence of the judiciary or obstruct the exercise
of its powers, neither will a process headed by a neutral judicial inspector general who
has only limited authority and who is removable at will by the Chief Justice.
iii. Practical Considerations
A final approach to separation-of-powers questions is to consider the practical
consequences of different outcomes. In his Clinton v. New York142 dissent, Justice
Breyer argued that the Court should interpret separation-of-powers principles in light
of the need for “workable government.”143 He argued that the Constitution authorizes
Congress and the President to experiment with “novel methods” to improve
government, such as the line-item veto.144 To Justice Breyer, this novel method was
an appropriate experiment that could have helped “representative government work
better.”145 Interestingly, Justice Scalia, who typically employed a formalist
methodology, took a rather functionalist approach and agreed with Justice Breyer’s
conclusion. Justice Scalia looked to the effect of the line-item veto and concluded that
there was no material difference between Congress authorizing the President to cancel
a spending item and Congress authorizing money to be spent on a particular item at
the President’s discretion.146 To Justice Scalia, because the latter was constitutional,
so was the former.
Taking a practical approach, one could argue that a government of checks and
balances cannot function properly without some way for the people, acting through
their congressional representatives, to hold federal judges accountable for their
misconduct. Thus, a judicial inspector general should be permitted, especially since
such an office is apparently not directly prohibited by the text of the Constitution. This
conclusion receives even more support when one considers the #MeToo Movement’s
profound and troubling revelations concerning the prevalence of sexual harassment in
the workplace, including in the judiciary.
Justice Scalia’s approach to the line-item veto would also support this outcome.
One could argue that judicial harassment may already be discovered and punished by
the judiciary and Congress through the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 or
through the impeachment process, so the investigations of a judicial inspector general
effects the same result, just by different means. This mirrors Justice Scalia’s argument
in Clinton that as long as the effect is constitutional, so are the means.
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CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the separation of powers doctrine jealously protects the decisional
independence of the judiciary, rather than its institutional independence. Accordingly,
since the founding of the United States, Congress has played a significant role in
regulating the institution and administration of the judiciary. So long as an inspector
general is not authorized or allowed to affect the judiciary’s decisional independence
in any way, an inspector general may constitutionally aid Congress in regulating the
judiciary as an institution. For the reasons above, and primarily because (1) an
inspector general would not interfere with the exercise of the judicial power and thus
would not violate the Constitution, (2) an inspector general would be expressly
prohibited from investigating matters pertaining to the judiciary’s decisional
independence, and (3) a judicial inspector general is needed in the wake of the #MeToo
Movement, Senator Grassley’s bill appears to be both constitutional and prudent.

